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1. Data {#sec1}
=======

This article presents the probabilistic model data of the time-dependent accident scenarios for a mixing tank mechanical system. Specifically, we revisit the earlier analyses of the accident scenarios by Khakzad et al. [@bib2] to illustrate the methodology presented in our research article [@bib1]. One of such accident scenarios occurred on 14 June 2006 at Universal Form Clamp in Bellwood (Illinois, U.S.) through a vapor cloud ignition [@bib3].

[Table 1](#tbl1){ref-type="table"} shows the failure probabilities of *Alarm* and *Sprinkler* for different ways of activating such components during an accident. In particular, the activation occurs if the vapor is ignited or if there is a specific amount of vapor concentration in the air, even though the vapor is not ignited.Table 1Conditional probabilities of *Alarm* and *Sprinkler* at $\tau = 0$ ($\tau$ refers to the time stage of the Bayesian model).Table 1VaporControlledOverflowIgnitionNo sparkSparkNo sparkSparkAlarmActivation000.77500.9987No activation110.22500.0013SprinklerActivation000.700.96No activation110.300.04

Based on the analyses by Khakzad et al. [@bib2], [Table 2](#tbl2){ref-type="table"} lists the system components and their failure probabilities. In addition, we assume that the activation of *Sprinkler* reduces the probability of delayed ignitions by 50%, as detailed in [Table 3](#tbl3){ref-type="table"} (last row, first and second columns). For this reason, the activation of the *Sprinkler* for a vapor concentration in the air could prevent delayed ignitions.Table 2List of components and respective failure probability.Table 2ComponentSymbolFailure probabilitySensorSensor0.0400Pneumatic unitP_unit0.2015Temperature control systemT_ctrl_sysOR gateOperatorOperator0.0200Infrared thermometerThermo0.0468Temperature measurement systemT_sysOR gateManual steam valveM_valve0.0243Automatic steam valveA_valve0.0276Automatic temperature control systemATCSOR gateManual temperature control systemMTCSOR gateHigh temperature protection systemHTPSAND gateVentilationVent0.0150FanFan0.0100BeltBelt0.0500DuctDuct0.0010Ventilation systemVent_sysOR gateVapor overflowVaporAND gateIgnition barrierIgnition0.1000Water sprinkler systemSprinkler0.0400, 0.3000Alarm systemAlarm0.0013, 0.2250Table 3Conditional probabilities of *Ignition* at $\tau > 0$ ($\tau$ refers to the time stage of the Bayesian model).Table 3Ignition \[$\tau - 1$\]No sparkSparkSprinkler \[$\tau - 1$\]ActivationNo activationActivationNo activationIgnition \[$\tau$\]No spark0.950.900Spark0.050.111

[Table 4](#tbl4){ref-type="table"} lists the nine possible outcomes of the accident scenarios where the state *Safe* represents the outcome following the non-occurrence of the system failure (*Vapor = Controlled*). The other outcomes are caused by malfunctions of some system components. Due to the activation of *Sprinkler*, accident consequences $C_{1}$ and $C_{2}$ are less severe than $C_{3}$ and $C_{4}$, respectively. This information is helpful in eliciting the disutility functions to specify the ranking of the outcome severity. The last column of [Table 4](#tbl4){ref-type="table"} shows illustrative disutility values that quantify the severity of the outcomes.Table 4List of accident outcomes ($C$ refers to the accident consequences, numbered based on increasing severity).Table 4OutcomeSymbolDisutilityControlled vapor*Safe*0Safe evacuation$C_{1}$10Wet vapor cloud near the ground$C_{2}$15Safe evacuation with possibility of delayed ignition$C_{3}$30Vapor cloud with possibility of delayed ignition$C_{4}$40Fire, moderate property damage, low death toll$C_{5}$60Fire, high property damage, low death toll$C_{6}$80Fire, moderate property damage, high death toll$C_{7}$90Fire, high property damage, high death toll$C_{8}$100

Based on the failure probabilities in [Table 2](#tbl2){ref-type="table"}, the Bayesian model computes the occurrence probabilities of the outcomes of the accident scenarios, reported in [Table 5](#tbl5){ref-type="table"} for each time stage. The deployment of preventive safety measures on some selected components mitigates the risk of the negative outcomes. [Table 6](#tbl6){ref-type="table"} lists the alternative preventive safety measures (second column) that affect the occurrence of failures of specific components (first column). The last two columns of [Table 6](#tbl6){ref-type="table"} report illustrative costs and updated failure probabilities of the components. In particular, the preventive safety measure *Synergy* refers to a combination of *Calibration test* and *Sensor*: if both measures are installed, this synergy effect yields more benefits than installing independent measures. The updated failure probabilities of *Sprinkler* and *Alarm* refer to the two different failure scenarios detailed in [Table 1](#tbl1){ref-type="table"}.Table 5Probabilities of accident outcomes at each time stage ($C$ refers to the accident consequences).Table 5Outcome$\tau = 0$$\tau = 1$$\tau = 2$$\tau = 3$$\tau - = 4$$\tau = 5$*Safe*0.9983190.9983190.9983190.9983190.9983190.998319$C_{1}$0.0008200.0012260.0012890.0012560.0012020.001144$C_{2}$0.0002386.539252e-051.485681e-053.229053e-066.934547e-071.484231e-07$C_{3}$0.0003520.0001163.270228e-058.908458e-062.410073e-066.510108e-07$C_{4}$0.0001026.202325e-063.767917e-072.289007e-081.390572e-098.447723e-11$C_{5}$0.0001610.0002640.0003430.0004110.0004750.000536$C_{6}$6.713624e-062.083401e-065.733853e-071.552510e-074.193539e-081.132327e-08$C_{7}$2.097377e-072.850967e-085.062283e-091.019337e-092.140727e-104.552654e-11$C_{8}$8.739072e-095.313530e-103.227972e-111.960993e-121.191303e-137.237167e-15Table 6List of preventive safety measures and respective failure probability.Table 6ComponentPreventive safety measureCost \[k€\]Failure probabilityP_unitInspection plan600.1500Duplication800.100M_valveCalibration test300.0200Sensor400.0150Synergy600.0100A_valveCalibration test300.0200Sensor400.0150Synergy600.0100BeltPeriodic test400.0300Condition monitoring1000.0100IgnitionTank blanketing700.0800Inerting systems1000.0600Hypoxic air technology1500.0400SprinklerStandard response400.0300, 0.2000Quick response800.0100,0.1000AlarmSemi-conductor sensor600.0013, 0.2000Catalytic gas sensor800.0013, 0.1500Electrochemical cells1000.0013, 0.1000

2. Experimental design, materials, and methods {#sec2}
==============================================

The failure probabilities of the components in [Table 2](#tbl2){ref-type="table"} are provided by the article by Khakzad et al. [@bib2]. Gates represents logic structures of the Bayesian model in our research article [@bib1]. The failure probabilities in [Table 6](#tbl6){ref-type="table"} have been obtained by reducing the initial failure probability of the components, based on a specific reduction rate for each preventive safety measure. These values illustrate the viability of the Bayesian model [@bib1], but do not represent any actual system. The occurrence probabilities of the outcomes of the accident scenarios have been computed by GeNIe Modeler [@bib4] through the Dynamic Bayesian Network presented in our research article [@bib1]. Finally, the severity of the outcomes has been quantified through the trade-off weighing approach SWING [@bib5].
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